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2008. First I focus on the repo market, a major funding source of the shadow
banking system, and show the repo market can create and amplify the fragility of
the system. Then I investigate a broader economy with heterogeneous agents and
demonstrate how the dynamics of equilibrium asset prices and wealth distributions
are determined.
In Essay 1, I develop a dynamic model of collateral circulation in a repo market,
where a continuum of institutions borrow from and lend to one another against
illiquid collateral. The model emphasizes an important tradeo . On one hand,
easier collateral circulation makes repos liquid and increases steady state invest-
ment through several multiplier e ects, improving economic e ciency. On the
other hand, it can harm financial stability because less capital is sitting on the
sidelines waiting for investment opportunities. This fragility is further exacerbated
by the endogenous repo spread through a positive feedback loop, and can result in
an ine cient repo run. The model is relevant for understanding the repo markets
during the financial crisis of 2008.
In Essay 2, I study the dynamics of the wealth distribution and asset prices in a
general equilibrium model. Agents face heterogeneous portfolio constraints that
limit the shares of risky investments relative to wealth. The setup is motivated by
empirical evidence that many households do not participate in the stock market
and portfolio shares are heterogeneous and persistent conditional on stock market
participation. There are two main results. First, one state variable can summa-
rize the wealth distribution regardless of the number of types of agents. Second,
when the economy is bad, it becomes more sensitive to additional negative shocks,
meaning that not only magnitudes of the shocks but also their frequency matters.
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Chapter I: Collateral Circulation and Repo Spreads
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 has highlighted the fact that procyclical leverage can be
devastating in downturns. Assets and liabilities of financial institutions, often re-
flecting collateralized lending mechanisms such as repos, expanded and contracted
with market fluctuations. Scholars have suggested that this leverage cycle might
arise due to price impact, fluctuating risk, shifts in beliefs of the marginal buyer,
changes in information asymmetry, or Knightian uncertainty.1
Less emphasized is the fact that financial institutions circulate (repledge or re-
hypothecate) collateral. One institution may be lending to another institution
against some collateral, while borrowing against the same collateral pledged by
his borrower. This aspect of the financial system has been understudied. In par-
ticular, most models in the literature feature two distinct groups, one that lends
and one that borrows, and focus only on borrowers’ financing constraints.
During the crisis, collateral circulation contracted more than leverage itself. Figure
I.1 plots, for the major US broker-dealers, the total book liabilities and total value
of collateral available for circulation over the last ten years. Between 2003 and
1See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997b), Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005), Shin (2010), Adrian
and Shin (2011), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakop-
los (2010), Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2012), Gorton and Ordonez (2012), Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2008), Caballero and Simsek (2009), among others.
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Figure I.1: The data is from 10-K reports of major US broker-dealers: Mor-
gan Stanley, Merrill Lynch/Bank of America, JP Morgan/Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and Citigroup.
2007, liabilities and collateral circulation both doubled in value. In 2008, a quarter
of liabilities evaporated, as did half the value of collateral available for circulation.
In absolute terms, the decline in the value of collateral for circulation was about
2.5 trillion dollars.2
My goal in this paper is to understand the economic importance of collateral
circulation. Does circulating collateral only mean the same collateral is counted
multiple times on the book, an accounting convention devoid of economic signif-
icance? Does allowing lenders and borrowers to be the same entities dampen or
amplify the leverage cycle? What are the implications of lenders, as well as bor-
rowers, facing financing constraints? What happens when collateral circulation
suddenly declines?
To address these questions I build a dynamic model of collateral circulation. I find
2Singh (2011) calculates the length of collateral chains using hedge fund data and reports
collateral was circulated on average 3 times in 2007 and 2.4 times in 2010. Singh and Aitken
(2009, 2010) document the sudden shortening of collateral chains in the US and Europe. See
also Monnet (2011).
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that collateral circulation poses a tradeo  between economic e ciency and finan-
cial stability. While easier collateral circulation makes repos liquid and increases
steady state investment through several multiplier e ects, it can make the finan-
cial system more fragile because less capital is left sitting on the sidelines waiting
for opportunities to arrive. This fragility is exacerbated by a positive feedback
loop between the endogenous repo spread and fire-sale discounts. As a result, a
sudden contraction of collateral circulation can result in an ine cient repo run.
In the model, there is a continuum of ex-ante symmetric financial institutions,
the total mass of which is fixed at unity. Each institution is endowed with the
same amount of liquid capital (cash) and cannot raise outside equity. These in-
stitutions invest in one class of assets that are illiquid. They can scale up their
investments by pledging the assets as collateral in order to borrow from other
institutions. Thus all investments are financed within the system of financial in-
stitutions, which has limited liquid capital. This setup is motivated by the recent
finding of Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2012) that a large share of complex
and illiquid securities, such as subprime mortgage-backed securities, are financed
by sophisticated financial institutions such as broker-dealers, investment banks,
hedge funds, or o -shore funds (or shadow banks).
Financial institutions receive random arrivals of investment opportunities as in
Kiyotaki and Moore (2001). An investment opportunity allows the institution to
purchase risky assets. The opportunity is specific to the institution, reflecting the
institution’s specialized skills. Assets mature at a random time and have to be
sold at a discount in the secondary market if liquidated before maturity. These
investments can be interpreted as originating and seasoning a pool of mortgages.
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Due to the random arrival of investment opportunities, at any given point in
time some financial institutions have opportunities while others do not. The repo
market allows those with opportunities to borrow from those without. Repos are
collateralized lending mechanisms where the haircut (i.e., the percentage di erence
between the principal and the collateral value) is set to make the loan safe. In
particular, I assume the haircut is set su ciently high so that lenders can recover
the principal by liquidating the collateral in the event of default by the borrower.
Financial institutions with opportunities optimally choose whether and how much
to borrow from the repo market. Financial institutions without opportunities
decide whether to invest in cash, earning the riskless rate, or to invest in repos,
earning the repo interest rate. The composition of the financial system (i.e., the
masses of asset, cash, and repo investors) is also endogenous.
When a repo investor receives an investment opportunity, he seeks to rehypoth-
ecate (i.e., circulate) collateral pledged by his borrower in order to finance his
investment. I assume that, with some probability q, the lender is able to circulate
the collateral quickly enough to finance the investment opportunity; with prob-
ability 1 ≠ q, the lender is unable to circulate the collateral, and the investment
opportunity is lost. The value of q thus measures the liquidity or “moneyness” of
repo collateral, and 1 ≠ q measures frictions associated with repos and not with
cash. Repos are equivalent to cash if q = 1.
Repo liquidity, q, captures three aspects of real-world collateral circulation: (a)
borrowers who worry about getting their collateral back may not allow lenders
to circulate it; (b) lenders may not circulate collateral for precautionary motives;
and (c) the ability of one institution to quickly circulate collateral is limited by
4
its connections to other institutions.
Taking the value of q as constant, I first study how the steady state of a dynamic
competitive economy depends on a given value of q. I then study how completely
unanticipated shocks, such as changes in q, a ect the transition path from one
steady state to another.3
Two main results emerge in a stationary equilibrium. First, the endogenous spread
between the repo rate and the riskless rate is generally positive, although repos
are free of credit risk. The positive repo spread compensates lenders for the
potential illiquidity of collateral when q < 1. The spread decreases in repo liquidity,
and increases in the arrival rate and the profitability of investment opportunities.
This positive spread is consistent with empirical evidence documented during the
recent financial crisis.4 Moreover, this result stands in contrast to the literature
following Du e (1996) on repo specialness, which implies negative spreads. Since
the financial system has limited cash, the cost of financing illiquid investments can
be higher than that of liquid investments, as captured by the repo spread.
Second, increased repo liquidity raises aggregate investment through three mul-
tiplier e ects. When repos are highly liquid, (a) each institution with an oppor-
tunity can take higher leverage and scale up their investment; (b) it is less likely
to default despite high leverage because the repo spread is su ciently low; and
(c) more institutions of the financial system can participate in risky investment.
Therefore, repo liquidity creates real multiplier e ects through the endogenous
choices of financial institutions.
After analyzing the steady state, I introduce unanticipated, permanent shocks and
3Ongoing work suggests the results are largely similar when the shocks are anticipated and
su ciently infrequent.
4See Gorton and Metrick (2011), Hordahl and King (2008), and Smith (2012).
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study the resulting deterministic transition paths from one steady state to another.
I focus on negative shocks to repo liquidity and the rate of asset maturity (i.e.,
economic slowdowns). I find two types of transition paths: a stable path and a repo
run. With a relatively small shock the secondary market absorbs the increased
supply of liquidated assets and the haircut remains constant, generating a stable
path. In contrast, a larger shock causes a repo run where collateral becomes
worthless, the haircut shoots up to unity, and all leveraged investors go bankrupt.
A positive feedback e ect between the repo spread and fire-sale discounts is respon-
sible for a repo run. When a shock causes an excess supply of liquidated collateral,
the secondary market price of these assets adjusts downward, resulting in fire-sale
discounts and higher haircuts. To acquire cheap liquidated assets, financial insti-
tutions with opportunities need to borrow from other institutions in the system,
who also understand the profit opportunities. The fire-sale discounts increase the
repo spread further, as the opportunity cost of having to forego profitable in-
vestments is higher. The escalating repo spread pressures existing borrowers and
discourages new borrowers from taking high leverage, leading to deeper discounts
and higher haircuts. Thus, lenders and borrowers being the same entities can be
destabilizing when the cost of financing is endogenous.
The amount of cash in the financial system determines whether a given shock
triggers a repo run. When repos have little moneyness the financial system hoards
large amounts of cash. The cash reserves, although “ine cient” when compared
to an equilibrium with more repo moneyness, make the financial system more
resilient. When there is a shock, the cash reserves help bu er the shock along the
transition path to the new equilibrium. When reserves are insu cient, a shock
6
results in fire sales and a repo run.
A repo run is constrained ine cient, in that a social planner with the same col-
lateral circulation constraint can achieve Pareto improvement. The possibility of
an ine cient repo run implies a role for a lender of last resort. To prevent a repo
run, central banks can lend to solvent financial institutions against a variety of
collateral at low rates, and with high haircuts to make loans safe. Such funding
programs reward institutions for being solvent in crises, mitigating moral hazard
problems.
My model sheds light on the divergence across repo markets during the financial
crisis of 2008. There are two types of repos: tri-party and bilateral repos. Tri-
party repos resemble traditional demand deposits without deposit insurance; and
collateral does not circulate. In bilateral repos, as in my model, sophisticated
financial institutions borrow from and lend to one another and circulate collat-
eral. During 2008, bilateral repos contracted sharply, as documented by Gorton
and Metrick (2010a,b, 2011, 2012). Both the haircut and the repo spread rose
markedly. Certain classes of securities stopped being used as collateral entirely,
and the repo spread rose from under 10 bp to over 200 bp on average, with a
maximum around 700 bp (see I.10). On the other hand, Krishnamurthy, Nagel,
and Orlov (2012) find tri-party repos remained largely stable throughout the cri-
sis. Consistent with their findings, my model shows that bilateral repos can be
fragile, with collateral circulation exacerbating the leverage cycle.
7
1.1 Related Literature
In the context of a repo market where collateral consists of Treasury securities,
Du e (1996) shows that the repo spread can be negative (or repo “special”).5 The
negative spread compensates collateral owners (who are borrowers in my model)
for lending scarce securities because short-sellers need to borrow the securities. In
contrast to Du e (1996), in my model liquid capital is scarce and the positive
repo spread compensates cash lenders. I contribute to this literature by modeling
circulating repo collateral and explaining positive repo spreads.
Monnet and Narajabad (2012) study the role of repos as opposed to asset sales.
They find that repos coexist with asset sales when there are bilateral trading
frictions and the uncertainty in the future value of collateral. Repos in my model
are used to finance investment because a given asset is worth more to borrowers
than to lenders, due to its inherent illiquidity. This role of repos as a funding
source for financial institutions has been emphasized since the recent financial
crisis. Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2011) focus on tri-party repos and show
that repo runs may result from investors not being able to adjust the haircuts
quickly. In my model, the terms of repos are updated continuously, yet repo runs
may still occur. In addition, my model produces systemic failures of the financial
sector rather than focusing on a single institution.
More broadly, my fragility result is related to the bank run literature following Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983). They show that banks’ capital structures, with illiquid
assets but liquid liabilities (demand deposits), are vulnerable to changes in credi-
5See also Du e, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), Krishnamurthy (2002), Vayanos and Weill
(2008) and Bottazzi, Luque, and Páscoa (2012).
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tors’ perceptions. Otherwise solvent banks may have to fail as each creditor fears
that others might run first. My model di ers from theirs in that all financial insti-
tutions are rational and the lenders understand fire-sale discounts, which actually
makes the system more fragile. Relatedly, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
show the fragility stemming from a positive feedback loop between the liquidation
price and financing constraints. He and Xiong (2012a) and Acharya, Gale, and
Yorulmazer (2011) emphasize short debt maturity as a source of fragility. The
primary di erence between these papers and mine is that I make the cost of fi-
nancing endogenous. In my model this repo spread a ects the amount of cash
reserves in the system, and plays a critical role in generating fragility.
Collateral circulation in my model is related to traditional credit chains. Rochet
and Tirole (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a) study an economy where firms
(or banks) borrow from and lend to one another. They show how credit chains
can lead to systemic risk as a liquidity shock to one firm in the network spreads
through chain reactions of default, i.e., domino e ects.6 In contrast, systemic risk
of collateral circulation arises from the endogenous responses of both borrowers
and lenders, rather than from chains of defaults. My paper is also related to the
broader literature on interbank markets, where banks makes unsecured loans to
one another.7
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on private money creation in mon-
etary economics. With circulating collateral, the repo market e ectively creates
money. Townsend and Wallace (1987) motivate circulating collateral by location
6See also Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2013), Gofman (2011), and Zawadowski
(2013).
7The fragility and ine ciency of these interbank markets have been studied by Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987), Flannery (1996), Allen and Gale (2000), Repullo (2005), Acharya and Skeie
(2011), and Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2012), among others.
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mismatch, while Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) use timing mismatch. The ine ciency
of repo runs in my model is consistent with Friedman (1960), who strongly argues
against the private creation of money. He argues that allowing private provision of
circulating liabilities generates indeterminacy of equilibrium and excess volatility.
Hayek (1976) and Fama (1980) oppose Friedman’s position, arguing that the cre-
ation of money can be done in markets e ciently. My model implies that although
collateral circulation makes the economy fragile and exposes it to the possibility
of a repo run, it creates positive multiplier e ects in normal conditions. Relatedly,
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) show fiat money can lubricate the economy when there
are borrowing and resaleability constraints. They also show that the expected rate
of return on money is lower than that of equity, which is also lower than the time
discount rate. In their model, only money circulates and there is no debt. Stein
(2012) study the link between monetary economics and financial stability where
commercial banks create private money by issuing short-term debts. I contribute
to this literature by showing how the shadow banking system can create private
money through circulating collateral in repo markets.
I proceed by describing the model in the next section and solving the stationary
equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 studies transition paths and fragility. Section
5 discusses the ine ciency of a repo run and policy implications, while Section 6
serves as a conclusion.
2 Model
Time is continuous with an infinite horizon. There is a continuum of financial
institutions (FIs) whose total mass is normalized to 1. All FIs are risk-neutral
10
and have a time discount parameter of fl, which is also the riskless rate. Each
FI is endowed with K units of liquid capital (cash), a numeraire. FIs can either
keep their cash in checking accounts, earning riskless rate fl (whom I call cash
investors), or invest in the repo market, earning repo rate fl+s with s being the
spread between the repo rate and the riskless rate (whom I call repo investors).
All repos mature at a random time that arrives according to a Poisson process
with rate ‡. Repo investors can switch to cash investors once their repos mature.
FIs receive an investment opportunity at a random time that arrives according
to a Poisson process with rate –. An opportunity is specific to the FI to which
it arrives and reflects its special skills. If cash investors receive an opportunity,
they instantly take it and become (asset) investors. However, if repo investors
receive an opportunity before their repos mature, they should borrow cash against
their borrower’s collateral (i.e., circulating the collateral) to take the investment
opportunity. A repo investor can do so only with exogenous probability q œ [0,1],
which measures the liquidity or moneyness of repo.
Investors can either buy new assets from the primary market at price B or buy
liquidated assets from the secondary market at p + „, where „ is the exogenous
per-unit transaction cost, making the e ective price of the asset p̄ © min{B,p+„}.
All assets mature according to a Poisson process with rate — and pay o  R per
unit when they mature. Investors also choose the scale of investments. They can
invest with their cash only or borrow from the repo market against the investments,
increasing the scale of investment.
When borrowing, investors take the terms of a repo contract (the haircut h, the
repo spread s and the repo maturity rate ‡) as given and solve for the optimal
11
Figure I.2: Three Markets
leverage. They choose how much of their cash to pledge (haircut capital x) or to
reserve (bu er capital K ≠x). When pledging x, the investor borrows x(1/h≠1)
and scales the investments by x/h. The bu er capital K ≠ x is used to pay a
stream of repo interest (fl+ s)x(1/h≠1). If investors run out of bu er capital
before their investments mature, they are forced into bankruptcy and exit the
system, and repo investors immediately liquidate the collateral in the secondary
market. I assume repo investors protect themselves from bankruptcy by setting
the haircut equal to the cost of liquidation. If investors are solvent when their
investments mature, they receive R per unit from the investment, pay back the
repo principal to repo investors, consume the rest and retire from the system.
Whenever FIs exit, the system is replenished with the same mass of new FIs,
fixing the total mass at 1.
Three markets are present in the model: (a) the primary market, where assets
are initially traded; (b) the secondary market, where liquidated collateral from
bankrupt FIs is traded; and (c) the repo market, where investors obtain financing
from repo investors and collateral circulates (see Figure I.2). I assume the supply
of the assets in the primary market is perfectly elastic, and focus on collateral
circulation in the repo market and its interaction with the secondary market.
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Without loss of generality, I set K = 1 and B = 1. I further assume the three
Poisson processes for opportunity arrival, investment maturity and repo maturity
are independent. The exogenous parameters of the economy are repo liquidity q,
the rates of the three Poisson processes (–, — and ‡), the riskless rate and time
discount parameter fl, the per-unit payo  from investment R and the transaction
cost in the secondary market „. A stationary equilibrium solves for the repo spread
sú, the optimal haircut capital xú, the secondary market price pú, the haircut hú,






such that all FIs make optimal decisions and all markets clear.
Assets There is one class of assets that are risky, profitable and illiquid. The
riskiness of assets lies in their random maturity. For an investment opportunity
to be meaningful, the assets should have positive net present value. Thus, I
assume that the net payo  is greater than the time value of money at the expected
maturity (1/—):
R ≠1 > fl
—
. (I.1)
Repo contracts A repo (sale and repurchase agreement) is a form of collateral-
ized lending with two main distinctions: (1) repos are often overcollateralized (the
di erence between the value of collateral and the principal of the loan as a fraction
of the value of collateral is called a haircut); and (2) repo lenders, unlike other
creditors, are exempt from automatic stay, meaning they can immediately liqui-
date collateral upon the borrower’s bankruptcy. Section 4.3 explains institutional
details relevant to the model’s implications.
All borrowers and lenders meet and clear the repo market instantly. There are
13
Figure I.3: Flow of Cash and Collateral
no search and matching frictions, and typically a pool of lenders are matched
with a borrower. The equilibrium repo spread is determined by clearing the repo
market. The spread is assumed to be the same across all FIs for tractability.
That is, lenders cannot observe or verify the individual borrower’s balance of
bu er capital, although a low balance may shorten the maturity. The haircut is
set so that repos are riskless from lender’s perspective as in Geanakoplos (1997,
2010).8 To simplify the wealth distribution, I further assume repo investors and
cash investors continuously consume their interest income.
Collateral Circulation I use mismatch in the preferred timing of lenders and
borrowers to generate collateral circulation, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001).
Consider the borrower A and the lender B in Fig I.3. A pledges the investment
as collateral and borrows cash from B. Until either A’s investment matures or A
runs out of cash and goes bankrupt, A keeps rolling over the repos at terms that
are updated frequently. The lender B may be willing to stay as a lender to A until
an opportunity arrives to the lender B. Then the lender B should rehypothecate
(i.e., circulate) A’s collateral to take the investment opportunity. B can circulate
8Whether this type of contract is optimal is beyond the scope of this paper. Rampini and
Viswanathan (2010) show when there is limited enforcement, an optimal contract limits debt
capacity to the amount that lenders can seize from collateral. I speculate that a similar setup
might make the repo contract in this model optimal.
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A’s collateral to C with an exogenous probability q and use the cash to borrow
from D against B’s own investment. In a similar fashion, A’s collateral may be
circulated from C to E, and so on. Thus, repo liquidity q determines the extent
to which a given collateral is circulated through the financial system.
Interpretation of the Setup A real-world example for the modeled assets is the
originate-to-distribute model, where FIs lend to homeowners, pool the (subprime)
mortgages, season the pool of mortgages, then securitize and sell them to buyers.
The mortgages tend to be seasoned, typically for six months to one year, before
they are sold as securities. This practice implies the pools of mortgages initially
originated are illiquid, and this illiquidity is one of the key characteristics that the
model captures in two ways. First, there is a transaction cost when the assets are
traded in the secondary market before they mature. Second, only the financial
institutions in the system can provide financing.
The key setup of the model is that FIs need an investment opportunity to purchase
assets in either the primary or the secondary market. This investment opportunity
is a modeling device that creates interim heterogeneity among institutions, and is
similar in spirit to the slow moving capital of Du e (2010); Mitchell, Pedersen,
and Pulvino (2007). There are several other simplifying assumptions in the model
including (1) the institutions cannot raise external equity either within the system
or outisde the system; (2) the haircut is set so that repos are free of credit risk; (3)
investment opportunities are specific to whom they arrive and cannot be transfered
to other institutions; and (4) financial institutions cannot merge, or acquire other
institutions. While relaxing these assumptions may be interesting topics for future
research, the main implication of the model is robust that the cost of financing
15
Figure I.4: The data is from 10-K reports of major US broker-dealers. The left
figure excludes Citigroup as they report the value of collateral allowed to circulate
only.
reflects the lost profit opportunities when repos are not perfectly liquid.9
The repo maturity is assumed random. The random maturity is common in a
continuous time model such as Carr (1998) and He and Xiong (2012a,b), and makes
the model tractable. Moreover, the random maturity captures the uncertainty
in timing that lenders and borrowers get their cash and collateral back. The
relationship between borrowers and lenders tends to be stable. In practice, even
when repos have overnight maturity, they are not expected to be terminated in
one day.10 The observed short maturity should be understood as frequent updates
in the terms of contracts (such as haircuts and repo spreads). In the model the
repo maturity is random, but the terms are updated continuously.
While the model focuses on the repo markets, collateral circulation is not unique
to the repo markets. The model can be applied to the broader financial markets.
Repo liquidity, q, captures three aspects of real-world collateral circulation, and
9In Extensions I relax the assumption that FIs exit after their investments mature.
10In private conversation, practitioners mentioned that it is customary to give a warning in
advance (one week to one month) when the parties want to terminate the contracts in bilateral
repos. While most tri-party repos have very short overnight maturity, there is no aggregate data
on the distribution of maturity in bilateral repos. Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2011) shows
the actual relationship between borrowers and lenders tends to be stable in tri-party repos.
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appears to have contracted during the recent crisis. First, borrowers who worry
about getting their collateral back may not allow lenders to circulate it as the
plot of collateral available for circulation (Figure I.1) shows. Second, lenders may
not circulate collateral for precautionary motives. The proportion of collateral
circulated relative to collateral allowed to circulate also declined in 2008 as in
the left plot of Figure I.4. Third, the relationships among financial institutions
depend on their network linkages; the ability of one institution to quickly circulate
collateral is determined by other institutions that it is linked to. For example, the
failure of Lehman Brothers greatly a ected hedge funds whose sole prime broker
was Lehman Brothers. The right plot of Figure I.4 shows that collateral circulation
was much more important for Lehman Brothers than other major broker-dealers.11
3 Stationary Equilibrium
This section solves for a stationary equilibrium of a dynamic competitive economy.
First I describe and solve the individual optimization problems of FIs. Given the
individual solutions, I solve a stationary equilibrium by clearing the markets, and
provide comparative statics.
3.1 Individual Optimization Problem
FIs with Investment Opportunities An FI with an investment opportunity (“asset
investor”) makes two decision: (1) he chooses to purchase assets in the primary or
secondary market or both, and (2) he chooses whether and how much to borrow
from the repo market. Since the primary market price is normalized to 1, the
11See also Aragon and Strahan (2012).
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e ective cost of asset per unit is
p̄ © min{1,p+„} (I.2)
The investor chooses whether or not to borrow against the assets to increase the



















is the random maturity of the asset. The unlevered value is greater than
1 by the profitability assumption (I.1).
If the investor chooses to borrow from the repo market, he needs to decide how
much to borrow. The investor can increase scale of the investments if he pledges
more. On the other hand, the investor has to pay the repo interest to stay solvent.
Thus, he needs to set aside cash whose balance he keeps in his checking account,
earning the riskless rate of fl.12 Suppose the investor pledges x units of haircut















Per unit of haircut capital pledged, the investor can buy 1
hp̄
units of the assets
from either the primary or the secondary market, whichever he prefers. When
the investment matures, each unit of the asset pays o  R and he pays back the
12Note that the investor keeps his bu er capital in the checking account and earns fl. The
investor is excluded from lending the bu er capital in the repo market because he needs to pay
the interest continuously.
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whose net payo  is simply the asset’s net payo  multiplied by leverage 1/h.
The investor pays the flow repo interest out of his bu er capital 1 ≠ x. The repo
interest is the repo rate (fl + s) multiplied by the principal. Thus, the investor











xd· = 1≠x. (I.6)
The duration of investor’s solvency, T
”
(x), decreases in haircut capital x because
of the reduced bu er capital as well as the increased repo interest. Then the
default probability of an investor can be obtained as









Combining (I.5), (I.6), and (I.7) yields the value of the leveraged investment. For
emphasis, I write it as a function of the repo spread s as below:
V
leveraged




























where the first part (x(1≠ ◊x)) is the haircut capital, which determines the scale of
investment, multiplied by the probability that the investor will remain solvent; and
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the second part is the expected payo , conditional on solvency, per unit haircut
capital, which is the sum of the investment payo  and the remaining bu er capital.
The first order condition with respect to haircut capital x when the leveraged
































where the L.H.S. is the marginal benefit of haircut capital and the R.H.S. is the
marginal cost of haircut capital. While the extra haircut capital increases the
scale of investment, it shortens the time that an investor would remain solvent,
making them more likely to default. Thus, the optimal level of haircut capital xú
(thus the optimal leverage xú/h) trades o  the increased scale with the possibility
of bankruptcy.













V◊ú (s) , (I.10)























Finally, the investor compares the value of leveraged and unlevered investment
and chooses whether or not to borrow. While the value of unlevered investment
is independent of the repo spread, the leveraged investment decreases in the repo
13If Vleveraged Æ 1, the optimal haircut capital is simply xú = 0 and Vleveraged = 1.
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spread. There is a unique upper threshold of the repo spread at which the investor
would stop borrowing from the repo market. The lemma below summarizes the
result. All proofs are in the Appendix.



























where ◊ú (s) solves (I.11). That is, an investor prefers to borrow from the repo
market if the repo spread is lower than ŝ and not to borrow otherwise. The cuto 





















FIs without Investment Opportunities FIs without an opportunity choose whether
to invest in cash or to invest in repos. A cash investor continuously earns and con-
sumes the riskless interest of rate fl. Once an investment opportunity arrives at
·
–











fl+– (VI ≠1) . (I.14)
A repo investor continuously earns and consumes the repo interest at rate fl + s
until one of three events occurs: (1) an investment opportunity arrives to the
repo investor at ·
–
, (2) the borrower’s investment matures at ·
—
or (3) the repo
matures at ·
‡
.14 If an opportunity arrives first, the repo investor can circulate
14The independence assumption of the processes guarantees no two events occur simultane-
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collateral with probability q, get his cash back, and become an asset investor.
If an opportunity arrives later than the other events, the repo investor chooses
whether to continue to lend or to become a cash investor.15 Then the value of a










































fl+ q– (VI ≠1) , (I.16)
which is independent of the repo maturity rate because of the independence as-
sumption.
While the value of a cash investor is independent of the repo spread, the value of a
repo investor increases in the repo spread. Thus, there is a unique lower threshold
of the repo spread s
l
Ø 0 at which FIs without opportunities would start lending
in the repo market.
Lemma 2. For a given level of the investor’s value (V
I















15If the borrower goes bankrupt, repo investors immediately liquidate the collateral in the
secondary market. Since the haircut is set so that repos are riskless, the repo investors can
recover the full principal.
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at which FIs without investment opportunities choose to invest in repos.
The minimum repo spread is nonnegative, and strictly positive if and only if repos
are not perfectly liquid (q < 1). The spread compensates repo investors for the
potential opportunity cost of lending. The opportunity cost arises from not being




Recall that the value of an investor V
I
depends on the repo spread (I.12). With a
slight abuse of notation, I denote by s
l













Assets versus Repos So far I have assumed FIs take an investment opporuntity
when they can. Asset investors, however, are free to become repo or cash investors.
Intuitively, investors would never prefer to become cash investors, but they may
prefer to become repo investors if the repo spread is su ciently high. From (I.16),















Note that ˆ̂s is always greater than the minimum spread for lending s
l
, as the
investor value is strictly higher than the value of a cash investor, regardless of
repo liquidity or the arrival rate of opportunities.
Combining (I.12) and (I.18), we find that an investor chooses to borrow if and only
16The solution exists and is unique as VI (·) is decreasing in s.
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if the repo spread is lower than both thresholds ŝ and ˆ̂s. Therefore, the maximum









Equilibrium Repo Spread FIs without investment opportunities will only invest
in repos if the repo spread is higher than s
l
(I.17), and asset investors will only
borrow if the repo spread is lower than s
b
(I.19). Thus, for the repo market to










], repo contracts create a surplus. How repo investors
and asset investors divide the surplus depends on their bargaining power, which
in turn is determined by the market clearing condition. The bargaining problem
between borrowers and lenders is described in detail in the Appendix. Here I focus
on the case where all the surplus of repos is extracted by borrowers (asset investors)
and the equilibrium repo spread equals the lender’s minimum s
l
. Proposition 6
provides the condition for which this is the case.17
If the minimum spread for lending s
l
is higher than the maximum spread for
borrowing s
b
, repos do not create surplus and the repo markets shut down. Then
the shadow price for the repo spread equals s
l
at which no investors borrow.

















Figure I.5: The Fixed-Point Problem
Therefore, the equilibrium repo spread sú is given as












(sú). Figure I.5 illustrates how the equilibrium spread sú and the
value of an investor V ú
I
are determined simultaneously as solutions to the fixed-
point problem. While the value of an investor decreases in the repo spread, the
indi erence repo spread increases in the value of an investor. Equilibrium values
are found where the two meet for given level of repo liquidity.
Equilibrium Composition of the Financial System Now I solve for equilibrium
masses of di erent types of FIs: investors (µ
I





). While an individual FI can transition between di erent types, the







, are solutions to the three equilibrium conditions. First, the total mass of FIs









Second, the inflow and outflow of investors should be equal for stationarity. The
inflow of investors is determined by the arrival of opportunities. A new investor
might have been a cash investor or a repo investor who circulated collateral. The



































Equilibrium Haircut Since investors can choose to purchase assets from the pri-
mary market at a price of 1 and the secondary market at a price of p, the equi-
librium secondary market price pú cannot be higher than 1 ≠ „. On the other
hand, the supply of assets in the secondary market at any point in time is strictly
lower than the total demand for the assets. This is because the optimal leverage
is constant across investors, and the inflow of investors is strictly greater than
the outflow of investors due to bankruptcy (I.23). As some incoming investors
must purchase assets from the primary market, pú cannot be lower than 1 ≠ „.
Therefore, we have
pú = 1≠„. (I.25)
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The equilibrium haircut hú is simply set so that repo investors are protected from
the cost of immediate liquidation. From the equilibrium secondary market price
above, we have
hú = „. (I.26)
So we have found a competitive stationary equilibrium. It always exists and is
unique.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique competitive stationary equilibrium for a







that satisfies (61), (47) - (51) , (I.25), (I.26),
xú = ◊≠1 (◊ú) (I.27)
where ◊ (·) and ◊ú are given in (I.7) and (I.11), if sú Æ s
b
and xú = 0, otherwise.
Note that the equilibrium repo spread sú is positive whenever collateral circula-
tion is frictional (q < 1). Specifically, the equilibrium spread is no less than the
minimum spread of lending s
l
, which is positive if and only if collateral chains
are frictional. This is the case even though haircuts are set so that repos are free
of credit risk, meaning repo investors can recover the full principal regardless of
borrower’s bankruptcy. Thus the repo spread in this model is not compensation
for credit risk but compensation for the opportunity cost that repo investors in-
cur. With frictional collateral chains, repo investors face a positive probability
(1 ≠ q > 0) that they may get an investment opportunity, but cannot circulate
collateral and have to forego profitable investments. The opportunity cost, and
thus the equilibrium spread, increase in the rate of opportunity arrival –, frictions
27



















Figure I.6: Comparative Statics. The baseline parameters are provided in Section
4.
in collateral chains (1 ≠ q), and the profitability of investments (V
I
≠ 1). Since
illiquid investments must be financed within a system that has limited cash, the
cost of capital may be higher than that for liquid investments, captured by the
repo spread.


























Comparative Statics Under conditions characterized in Proposition 2, I find that
collateral circulation increases aggregate investment, exhibiting three multiplier ef-
fects. As repos become more liquid the repo spread decreases and thus (1) individ-
ual FIs optimally take higher leverage and undertake a larger scale of investment;
(2) their assets are less likely to default, i.e., are safer, even with higher leverage;
28
and (3) there are more FIs that are investing in their own assets in the system.18
Proposition 2. Provided that the transaction cost „ satisfies (62), and the asset
payo  R satisfies
R Ø 1+4 fl
—
, (I.28)














Thus, we answer the first question posed in the introduction. Clearly, collateral
circulation not only creates double-counting problems, but also creates real mul-
tiplier e ects. The analogy between circulating repo collateral and the money
multiplier, such as in Gorton and Metrick (2011) and Shin (2010), appears to be
accurate. Multiplier e ects of collateral circulation operate through the endoge-
nous cost of financing, which in turn a ects optimal leverage, default probability,
and the mass of investors.
4 Shocks and Fragility
Now I introduce various shocks to the economy and study transition paths. First
I explain the equilibrium concepts. Second, I compute the transition paths when
the economy is subject to various shocks. Third, I explain the positive feedback
e ect that arises from endogenous haircuts and repo spreads. Lastly, I connect
the model’s implications to the financial crisis of 2008.
18In general, the default probability ◊ú is concave in the repo spread, at first increasing
and then decreasing. However, I find that as long as the payo  of unit investment R satisfies
(I.28), the equilibrium repo spread always lies in the region such that the default probability is
increasing in the repo spread, regardless of other parameters.
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4.1 Deterministic Transition Path
Consider an economy with a set of parameters {q0,–0,—0,‡0,fl0,R0,„0}. By Propo-
sition 1, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium denoted by (xú0, sú0,hú0,pú0,µú0).
Suppose a shock that is completely unanticipated and permanent arrives at t = T .
The shock is defined as changes in the parameters to {q,–,—,‡,fl,R,„}, where q is
the collateral circulation parameter, –, —, ‡ are the intensities of the investment
opportunity arrival, investment maturity and repo maturity, fl is the time discount
parameter and the riskless rate, R is the payo  of the investment at maturity, and
„ is the transaction cost of secondary market assets.
I study a competitive equilibrium along a deterministic transition path. Once a
shock arrives, all FIs in the economy have full information about the new pa-
rameters instantly. Moreover, all FIs have perfect foresight with respect to the
dynamics of equilibrium prices and terms of repo contracts. All FIs make individ-
ually optimal decisions and markets clear at all instants. There is no remaining
uncertainty, making the transition path deterministic. As discussed in Section
2, I let the terms of repos - both the repo spread and haircut - adjust continu-
ously regardless of the random repo maturity, to reflect the reality of short repo
maturities.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium along a deterministic transition path








,µ(t) | ’t œ [T,Œ)} that satisfies
(i) ’t Ø T , FIs with an opportunity choose the optimal level of leverage (including
completely refraining from borrowing) and pledge X
t
if borrowing, taking as given
the future repo rate {S
·
}, the haircut {H
·




} ’· Ø t. FIs without opportunities optimally choose either to lend in
the repo market or to wait.
(ii) ’t Ø T , all markets clear or the price hits the boundary (P
t
= 0).







’t Ø T ) evolve according to processes consistent with FIs’ optimal strategies.
First consider an intuitive case. One candidate for a transition path is a stable
path where the secondary market price remains constant (P
t
© 1 ≠ „). Recall
that in a stationary equilibrium the demand for assets is strictly higher than the
supply of the secondary market. That is, the secondary market has a capacity to
absorb some extra supply of liquidated assets without a ecting its price. As the
secondary market price remains constant, so does the haircut. Fixing the haircut,
the optimal choices of FIs after the shock are similar to those in a stationary
equilibrium with new parameters.
Definition 2. A stable path is a competitive equilibrium along a deterministic
transition path such that for ’t Ø T ,
X
t
= xú1, St = sú1, Ht = „ and Pt = 1≠„ (I.30)
where (xú1, sú1,hú1 = „,pú1 = 1≠„) are the values of a stationary equilibrium with
the new parameters {q,–,—,‡,fl,R,„}.
Here I describe the dynamics of the masses of di erent types of FIs for the case
when both the stationary equilibrium before the shock and after the shock are
of Type 1 (i.e., all investors borrow). Even though all the prices instantly jump








(t)) for ’t Ø T ) slowly converge to the new stationary equilibrium
levels. FIs enter and exit the system and transition between types at di erent rates
from those before the shock. Moreover, immediately after the shock, FIs who
entered before and after the shock coexist. Once all the old FIs exit the system,
rates at which FIs enter and exit the system and transition between types are the
same as those in a stationary equilibrium with new parameters, hence converging
to the stationary equilibrium levels and remaining constant afterwards.
Consider an FI whose project started at t0, before the shock, and is ongoing at the
time that the shock arrives (i.e., t0 < T and t0 +T ú
”0 > T , where T ú”0 © T” (xú0) and
T
”
(·) is defined in (I.6)). If it were not for the shock, the FI would either succeed in
their investment and retire from the system or go bankrupt by t0 +T ú
”0. However,
with the shock the repo spread changes from sú0 to sú1 although the haircuts remain
the same along the stable path. Therefore, the duration that the FI can remain














That is, if the shock increases the repo spread (sú1/sú0 > 1), the FI can remain
solvent for a shorter horizon (T̃
”
(t0) < T ú
”0). It is more sensitive to the shock if
their investment started shortly before the shock.
By substituting t0 æ T into (I.31), we can see that FIs who started investments
right before the shock can remain solvent until T̂ , after which all the old FIs exit
















T̂ © T + T̃
”

















which reduces to T +T ú
”0 if it were not for the shock.
Between the arrival of the shock at T and the exit of all old FIs at T̂ , the mass of
investors µú
I

























The inflow to the investor type is determined by the new circulation parameter q
and the masses of repo investors and cash investors. The outflow from the investor
type is determined by the new intensity of investment maturity — and the defaults
of old investments. Here,
 ú (t) © exp{≠ [(— ≠—0)(t≠T )+—0T ú
”
(t0)]} (I.34)
represents the remaining investments that started at t0 (< T ) and default at t
(i.e., t0 + T̃
”
(t0) = t, where T̃
”
(·) is defined in (I.31)). Investments mature at rate
—0 before the shock and — after the shock. Without a shock to the investment






The dynamics of µú
I
(·) after T̂ are omitted as it is similar to that of a stationary
equilibrium in (I.22) - (I.24) in the sense that it is solely determined by investors
that entered after the shock, and their optimal choices are the same as those in
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the new stationary equilibrium. Initially, µú
I
(·) is not constant as it depends on
the stocks of repo investors and cash investors that are di erent from that of the
stationary equilibrium. Then all the masses converge to the stationary equilibrium
(see I.7).
The outflow of investors due to bankruptcy in (I.34) determines the supply of the
secondary market. As the haircut remains constant along a stable path, the scale
of investment is proportional to the haircut capital xú0 and xú1. Recall that for
a stable path to exist, the secondary market must absorb potential increases in
supply so that the prices do not fluctuate. Thus by comparing the demand and
supply for assets we get the following necessary condition for the existence of a
stable path.



















>  ú (t) (I.35)
Thus, whether a given shock triggers a repo run. When repos have little moneyness
the financial system hoards large amounts of cash. The cash reserves, although
“ine cient” when compared to an equilibrium with more repo moneyness, make
the financial system more resilient. When there is a shock, the cash reserves help
bu er the shock along the transition path to the new equilibrium. When reserves
are insu cient, a shock results in fire sales and a repo run.
Consider the case when the necessary condition (I.35) does not hold. That is,
there is an excess supply in the secondary market due to the shock and the price
has to adjust. Intuitively, the secondary market price should adjust downwards
to attract investors to buy more assets. The price p of the asset in the secondary
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market is determined by market clearing conditions, similar to the cash-in-the-
market pricing of Allen and Gale (1994, 2005).
One extreme example for a transition path is a repo run, where the secondary
market price hits its lower bound (P
T
= 0). In a repo run, collateral is worthless
and all existing investors are forced into bankruptcy. All FIs become cash investors
and the economy starts anew and slowly converges to a new stationary equilib-
rium. The following proposition shows that a repo run is indeed a competitive
equilibrium transition path whenever (I.35) doesn’t hold.
Proposition 4. Define a repo run as a competitive equilibrium along a determin-





= 0 and µ
W
(T ) = 1
















Parameter selection I use parameter values which are consistent with the data
and previous research. Following the 4.97% average one-year Treasury rate during
the first half of 2007 (which is before the financial crisis), I set the discount rate
to fl = 0.05. The transaction cost „ equals the haircut in a stationary equilib-
rium. According to Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2011), the haircuts for private
collateral in the bilateral repo market during a stable period were about 5% for
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high-grade corporate debt, 17% for Alt-A, prime MBS and 25% for subprime MBS,
so I set „ = 0.15. For the investment maturity intensity (—), I set — = 0.5, mean-
ing it takes about two years to finish a project. I set – = 0.2 and R = 1.8. The
model is robust to a wide range of parameters. As a benchmark, I use frictionless
collateral circulation (q0 = 1). Based on I.1, I use q = 0.5 as the level of collateral
circulation after the shock.
Iteration method Solving for a competitive equilibrium along a deterministic
transition path is similar to solving a fixed point problem. Once the shock arrives,
all FIs learn the parameters, future prices, and repo terms perfectly, and make an
optimal decisions. In turn, all markets clear at those prices. I use an iteration
method to find a transition path. That is, I start with various initial levels of
prices and terms, solve for the optimal policies, and check whether the markets
clear at those prices. The terms adjust accordingly when the markets do not clear.
I keep iterating this procedure until the full paths solve the fixed point problem.
The investors’ optimization problems and the clearing of the secondary market
when both the haircut and repo spread can fluctuate are described in Extensions.
Circulation shock First I study a negative shock to collateral circulation where
the circulation parameter q decreases from the initial frictionless value q0 = 1.
Using q = 0.5, which was documented during the financial crisis, I find the economy
is stable, with no changes in the secondary market price and thus the haircut. The
repo spread instantly jumps to the new stationary equilibrium level (from 0 bp
to 271 bp), while the masses of investors, repo investors and cash investors slowly
converge to the new stationary equilibrium levels (Top left of I.7).
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Figure I.7: Top figures report the evolution of masses of di erent types of FIs
when the circulation parameter decreases from 1 to 0.5 (left) and 0.22 (right).
Middle figures report the equilibrium haircut (left) and repo spread (right) when
the economy exhibits a repo run. Bottom figures report the evolution of masses
of di erent types of FIs (left) and the output as a fraction of the pre-shock level
(right) when the economy su ers both the circulation shock (q1 =0.5) and the
economic slowdowns (— decreases by 10%).
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Numerically, I experiment by lowering q in 1% increments. From Proposition
3, I find that the stable path is no longer supported when q Æ 0.22. Once the
circulation parameter hits the threshold 0.22, the secondary market cannot absorb
the increase in supply and a fire-sale discount is necessary to clear the market.
Then the powerful positive feedback e ect, as explained more in detail below,
starts to kick in. As a result, the iteration method with the initial condition of the
stable path ends up converging to the run equilibrium. In I.7, I document the run
equilibrium when q = 0.22. At the shock, the haircut increases to unity and all the
existing borrowers are forced into bankruptcy. With the secondary market price
at 0, the spread jumps up to 35.92% (which is the shadow spread at which no repo
contracts occur), then immediately comes back to 381bp. While the individual
optimization problem after the shock is similar to that of a stationary equilibrium,
the measures of types of bankers slowly converge to the stationary equilibrium level
(Top right of I.7). As shown, the measure of investors increases continuously from
0 at the shock, but then decreases for a short period of time before it converges
to the stationary equilibrium level. The overshooting is coming from the lack
of a stock of investment in the initial period. Once investments started after the
shock start to go bankrupt , the measure decreases and converges to the stationary
equilibrium level.
Other shocks I consider other types of shocks to the economy. First, I experiment
with the investment maturity intensity declining by 10% (—0 = 0.5 æ —1 = 0.45)
simultaneous with the circulation shock (q0 = 1 æ q1 = 0.5). The reduction in the
maturity intensity implies it takes 10% longer for a project to mature, creating
“economic slowdowns”. I find that when the combined circulation shock (q1 = 0.5)
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and economic slowdown hits the economy, the economy does not support the stable
path any longer and exhibits a repo run (middle and bottom figures of I.7). The
haircut instantly jumps up to 1 and comes back to the stationary equilibrium level
(0.15) immediately. The repo spread increases up to 25.67% then comes back to
the new stationary equilibrium level 2.83%.
The economic slowdown further directly a ects the output of the economy. The
flow output of the economy is simply given by —R (1≠µ
W
(t)), where all the capital
that is utilized in the economy (1≠µ
W
(t)) produces output R per unit at maturity,
and matures at rate —. Thus, with the economic slowdown the economy produces
lower output and takes longer to recover to the new stationary equilibrium. The
bottom right figure of I.7 shows that the temporary impact of the shock can be
much greater than the permanent impact when the shock causes a repo run.
Moreover, the reduction in the opportunity arrival intensity –, similar to the
shock to —, exacerbates the instability of the economy. Recall that the stationary
equilibrium repo spread at which repo investors and cash investors are indi erent
increases in – (I.17). Thus, when combined with the circulation shock (and the
economic slowdown), the reduction in – may lower the spread that the existing
borrowers have to pay out of their bu er capital. However, the reduction in –
directly reduces the flow of investors who can purchase liquidated assets in the
secondary market. I find that this direct e ect is much stronger than the repo
spread e ect, exacerbating the instability.
Lastly, I consider a reduction in the riskless rate fl. A reduction in fl can improve
the stability of the economy. It lowers the repo interest that existing borrowers
have to pay without a ecting the entry to the investor type (I.31). A su ciently
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big reduction in fl can cancel out the impact of the negative circulation shock,
and restore the stability of the economy. It further makes all FIs more patient, or
equivalently makes time pass faster. Thus the reduction in fl can also cancel out
the impact of the negative shock to either — or –. With the same logic, an increase
in the riskless rate fl works the opposite direction, exacerbating the instability of
the economy. A low discount rate fl can foster future fragility of the economy.
With a low fl, investors choose a low level of bu er capital and take high leverage,
therefore making the economy susceptible to repo runs when negative shocks hit
the economy.
Positive Feedback E ect This model presents a novel mechanism, where a posi-
tive feedback e ect escalates haircuts and repo spreads. The intuition is as follows
and illustrated in I.8.
A negative circulation shock (q ¿) instantly increases repo spreads as compensation
for the increased opportunity cost of lending. The higher repo spread pressures
existing borrowers and pushes them to default earlier. Moreover, it discourages
new borrowers from taking high leverage as shown in comparative statics in 3.
For a small shock (i.e., the di erence between the degree of circulation before
and after the shock is small), the increased supply and decreased demand in the
secondary market are absorbed by attracting more borrowers from the primary
market. In a stationary equilibrium, aggregate demand is always higher than
supply in the secondary market, guaranteeing a positive measure of buyers in
the primary market. However, if the shock is su ciently large, so the degree of
circulation drops below a threshold q̄, there will be an excess supply of assets that
cannot be absorbed by new borrowers.
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Figure I.8: Positive feedback mechanism through the haircut á la Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) (left) and through both the haircut and repo spread (right)
For shocks that cause any positive excess supply of liquidated assets, the secondary
market price p should adjust downward to clear the market, resulting in fire-
sale discounts (or cash-in-the-market pricing). As repo investors can continuously
adjust the terms of repos, they adjust the haircut upward one-for-one to protect
themselves from the potential cost of immediate liquidation. The higher haircut
has three e ects: (1) it requires existing borrowers to pay extra cash for the haircut
out of bu er capital and pushes them to even earlier bankruptcy, (2) it lowers the
extent to which new borrowers can take leverage for a given level of haircut capital,
but incentivizes them to increase the amount of haircut capital so that they can
take advantage of the present discounts, and (3) it pushes the repo spread even
higher, as repo investors understand the fire-sale discount and its profitability, and
require compensation for the increased opportunity cost.
The further increase in the repo spread again pressures existing borrowers and
discourages new borrowers from taking leverage. Therefore, the escalating repo
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spread and haircut positively reinforce each other. This positive feedback e ect
causes an arbitrarily small (but positive) amount of excess supply to drive the
haircut up to 1, pushing all existing borrowers into bankruptcy and not allowing
new borrowers any leverage. The positive spread is consistent with empirical
evidence documented during the recent financial crisis. Gorton and Metrick (2011)
document that repo spreads increased from 6.03 bp in the first half of 2007 to 84.27
bp in the second half of 2007, and to 248.29 bp in 2008. Hordahl and King (2008)
and Smith (2012) also document the repo spread being mostly positive and sharply
increasing during the crisis.
This feedback mechanism results in repo runs where all existing borrowers are
forced into bankruptcy. This channel is distinct from the previous literature on fi-
nancial fragility. Since Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the key component of fragility
(or “runs”) has been the the lack of sophistication of lenders. More recently, Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that margins, similar to haircuts, are desta-
bilizing if and only if the lenders are unsophisticated. The general dialogue of
the recent financial crisis therefore became that of unsophisticated and panicking
lenders. In contrast, I am able obtain fragility when all agents are sophisticated.
The key di erence between the two models is that the spread is endogenous in my
model, which plays a key role in repo runs.
Whether a repo spread should be endogenous or fixed at zero depends on the
specific markets considered. In markets where collateral is simple and liquid, such
as Treasury securities and stocks, the zero spread assumption may be suitable
as the pool of potential lenders is large. However, when financing complex and
illiquid collateral such as subprime mortgage-backed-securities, the pool of lenders
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Figure I.9: Transition Path with the Repo Spread Fixed at Zero
who would accept them as collateral is limited and should be taken into account.
Therefore the cost of financing illiquid collateral should be endogenous and may
well be higher than the prevailing riskless rate, resulting in a positive spread.
In I.9, I report the transition path when the repo spread is exogenously fixed
at zero to emphasize the role of the endogenous spread in the fragility of the
repo market to the circulation shock. Even though the economy su ers both the
circulation shock (q1 = 0.5) and the economic slowdown (— decreases by 10%), the
economy exhibits a stable path.
4.3 Financial Crisis of 2008
Here I briefly describe real world collateral circulation and map the model into the
financial crisis of 2008. For additional sources of institutional details, see Fleming
and Garbade (2003), Singh and Aitken (2009, 2010), Singh (2011), Copeland,
Martin, and Walker (2011) and Adrian, Begalle, Copeland, and Martin (2012).
43
Collateral circulation is not unique to repo contracts. Financial institutions may
receive collateral as a result of other leveraged investment strategies. (In the US,
Rule 15c3–3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 limits broker-dealers from
circulating their customers’ collateral to a certain extent.) The flip side of repo
contracts is securities lending, where investors borrow securities from the owners
for various purposes (e.g. shorting). In any case, lenders and borrowers may
bilaterally agree that lenders are allowed to circulate collateral. Instead of trying
to model various strategies, I focus on repos as the repo market is very large and
one of the key funding sources for shadow banks.
There are two distinct types of repos: tri-party and bilateral repos. In tri-party
repos, a clearing bank provides clearing and settlement services to lenders and
borrowers. Typically, lenders are cash rich investors such as money market mu-
tual funds and securities lenders, and borrowers are broker-dealers. Most tri-party
repos are backed by highly liquid securities such as Treasury and Agency securi-
ties. Lenders accept illiquid collateral from a few large institutions, but haircuts
are not adjusted according to market conditions. Moreover, collateral does not
circulate in tri-party repos. Once collateral is pledged in tri-party repos, it is
not further repledged. Essentially, tri-party repos resemble traditional demand
deposits without explicit deposit insurance.
It is bilateral repos that my model is designed to address. In bilateral repos,
various financial institutions borrow from and lend to each other and circulate
collateral. Many types of collateral are accepted including risky, complex and
illiquid securities. They are free to adjust the terms of repos according to market
conditions. Note that a broker-dealer may receive collateral from a hedge fund and
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Figure I.10: Repo Spread during the Financial Crisis. Source: Gorton and Metrick
(2011).
pledge it in tri-party repos, making tri-party repos the end-point of a collateral
chain.
The di erences between the two repos are crucial in understanding what happened
in the repo markets during the recent crisis. A sharp contraction in bilateral repos
has been documented by Gorton and Metrick (2010a,b, 2011, 2012). The average
haircut increased from 0 to 45% and certain classes of securities stopped being
used as collateral entirely. The average repo spread increased from under 10 bp
to over 200 bp, with a maximum close to 700 bp as in I.10.20 However, Krishna-
murthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2012) find that tri-party repos remained largely stable,
consistent with the fact that most tri-party repos were backed by safe collateral
that became more valuable during the crisis. On the other hand, funding for illiq-
uid collateral completely dried up, but only a tiny fraction of illiquid collateral
was financed by tri-party repos to begin with. They conclude the problem in
the repo market was more like a credit crunch caused by dealer banks tightening
their funding for the borrowers than a traditional bank run caused by panicked
depositors.
20See also Adrian and Shin (2010).
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My model is consistent with their findings that bilateral repos with collateral circu-
lation can be fragile, and perhaps more fragile than tri-party repos, with collateral
circulation exacerbating the leverage cycle. This model suggests a mechanism for
such a credit crunch among shadow banks in conjunction with the fact that col-
lateral circulation su ered a large, negative shock during the crisis. Repo runs
during the financial crisis of 2008 may not have been caused by panicking and
uninformed lenders, but rather by the inherent fragility of collateral circulation.
5 Welfare
When a repo run occurs after a shock to collateral circulation, all existing repo
investors as well as borrowers are forced into bankruptcy since collateral becomes
worthless. If all the existing repo investors could get together, they would prefer
to avoid a run by not raising the repo spread. The fact that repo investors can
update the terms of the repo instantly and there is a continuum of repo investors
who act competitively is the source of constrained ine ciency. Of course, given the
shock to collateral circulation and changes in market prices, the optimal response
of repo investors is to make their repos safe and get their required compensation.
Collectively, however, this creates a repo run that forces the existing repo investors
into defaults upon the shock. That is, a repo run equilibrium is constrained
ine cient.21
Proposition 5. A repo run equilibrium is constrained ine cient. Upon the ar-
rival of a shock, a social planner, who cannot directly a ect collateral circulation,
21Relatedly, Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2011) show such pecuniary externalities (a type
of externalities that operate through prices rather than real resources) can cause real ine ciency
when agents have financial constraints.
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can obtain welfare gains by taxing existing repo investors to support the interest
payment of the existing borrowers.
The fragility of collateral circulation and the ine ciency of a repo run perhaps
echo Friedman (1960), who strongly argued against the private creation of money.
He argued that allowing private provision of circulating liabilities generates inde-
terminacy of equilibrium and excess volatility. Thus the creation of money should
be segregated from all private market activity and solely left to the government.
On the other hand, Hayek (1976) and Fama (1980) argued that even the creation
of money can be done in markets e ciently.22
Collateral circulation, e ectively creating money within the system of financial
institutions, does create extreme fragility to a sudden shock as Friedman argued.
However, banning all institutions from bilaterally agreeing to circulate collateral
can be harmful. Collateral circulation in normal times creates liquidity in the
system and real multiplier e ects, allowing more investment in the economy, as
Hayek and Fama predicted. That is, there is a trade-o  between the economic
growth and financial stability. Frictionless collateral circulation leads to more
investment and promotes growth, but increases the likelihood that the economy
will be exposed to an ine cient repo run.
5.1 Policy Implications
Since the recent crisis academics and policy makers have focused on the level of
leverage and capital requirements for financial institutions. The repo market’s
behavior during the crisis, the steep decline in collateral for circulation as docu-
22See also Azariadis, Bullard, and Smith (2001).
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mented here, and the fragility the model produces all point to the importance of
collateral circulation and its fragility. Several broker-dealers play an important
role in collateral circulation, and circulating collateral is more important for some
institutions than others. Thus it may be necessary for regulators to keep track of
collateral circulation with a special focus on financial institutions that are critical
in collateral circulation and heavily rely on it. In other words, these institutions
are systemically important financial institutions (or SIFIs.)
The result on the tradeo  between growth and stability implies that simply ban-
ning collateral circulation is not ideal and can be very costly. Rather, it suggests
there is a role for the lender of last resort. The central bank can provide funding in
a crisis to avoid runs while supporting economic growth in good times. Suppose in
a crisis collateral circulation suddenly contracts. For example, borrowers become
worried about getting their collateral back and do not allow lenders to circulate
it, lenders become cautious and sit on collateral, or critical institutions in the net-
work fail. The central bank can restore collateral circulation by lending against
collateral to jittery borrowers, lenders who wish to circulate their collateral, and
the institutions whose prime brokers are failing. In other words, the central bank
becomes a part of the system temporarily.
In fact, this is what the Federal Reserve did during the recent crisis. Emergency
lending facilities such as the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) were set up to inject liquidity into the system
through primary dealers.23 The programs lent cash or Treasury securities against
a range of collateral. Rapid policy responses may be essential during a crisis, so it
23Primary dealers are twenty or so financial institutions that frequently trade with the Federal
Reserve system in its implementation of monetary policy.
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may be preferable to have such funding programs permanently on standby rather
than as emergency facilities. The terms for funding - both the haircut and repo
rate - can be set so that they are only favorable in a crisis, similar to discount
windows. However, the existence of such programs, unlike deposit insurance, is
not su cient to stop runs from happening since repo runs are not driven by mere
perceptions. The programs should be ready into inject liquidity to the system.
The idea that the lender of last resort should lend against collateral goes back to
Bagehot (1878) (see also Thornton (1802) and Goodhart (1999)). He argued that
to avert panic, central banks should lend to solvent firms against good collateral
early, without limit, and at high rates. In contrast, my model suggests that to
stop a run from happening after a shock to collateral circulation, the lender of
last resort should lend (1) against a variety of collateral, including risky, complex
and illiquid securities, (2) at low rates, perhaps even zero spread, but (3) with
an appropriate haircut to make the loan safe. From the divergence across repo
markets during the crisis, the strain appears to be concentrated among illiquid
securities. Even loans against risky collateral can be safe as long as the haircut
is set accordingly. Financial institutions should be allowed to pledge a portfolio
of securities, thus lowering the haircut required to make the loan safe. Central
banks have an advantage as a lender, compared to those in the system, in that
they have flexibility in their horizon for liquidating collateral rather than having
to liquidate collateral immediately.
The funding programs could limit the range of acceptable collateral to those that
may be risky and illiquid but have high hold-to-maturity value, exploiting the ad-
vantage of their flexibility. The liquidity injected could be trickled down to more
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illiquid assets, as financial institutions that own such collateral can use liquidity
to purchase other assets at deep discounts. This will be especially profitable for
the institutions in a crisis since the loans have low rates. Without any programs,
collateral circulation poses the problem of too-many-to-fail (Acharya and Yorul-
mazer (2007)), where numerous financial institutions, regardless of their size, fail
together and central banks end up supporting failing institutions ex-post. Thus,
having a funding program with eligible collateral being specified in advance would
reward financial institutions for staying solvent and owning sound collateral in a
crisis, mitigating moral hazard problems.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have studied the economic importance of collateral circulation in
a dynamic competitive economy. A continuum of ex-ante symmetric financial in-
stitutions borrow from and lend to one another against illiquid collateral. As in
Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), the institutions receive random arrivals of investment
opportunities, which allow them to invest in risky, profitable, and illiquid assets.
That institutions need an opportunity to make investments is related to the slow-
moving capital literature following Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) and
Du e (2010). Due to financing constraints that limit the ability of institutions
to issue equity or risky debt, institutions have an incentive to conserve liquidity
(cash) for future investments. When repos are liquid (or have high “moneyness”)
institutions substitute cash with repos. The capital invested in repos allows other
institutions to take leverage and scale up their investments. While collateral cir-
culation increases steady state investment, it can make the financial system fragile
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because less capital is sitting on the sidelines waiting for investment opportunities
to arrive. The positive feedback loop between the repo spread and fire-sale dis-
counts can result in ine cient repo runs, suggesting a role for a lender of the last
resort.
This paper leaves several important questions for future research. One such ques-
tion is what determines repo liquidity, or the ease of collateral circulation. Many
real-world frictions, such as search frictions, network e ects, and imperfect compe-
tition, can potentially play a role. Given the ine ciency in a competitive equilib-
rium, it is also an open question whether large institutions will internalize fire-sale
externalities, possibily improving welfare. Another question is what happens when
there are more than one class of assets. Financial institutions in reality own and
borrow against a portfolio of assets, and shocks to collateral circulation may limit
the extent to which they can do cross margining. This can create contagions
across assets and institutions, similar to Kyle and Xiong (2001). Finally, it is
important to consider what happens when shocks are anticipated. Ongoing work
suggests when shocks are su ciently infrequent, the results are largely unchanged,































































We can see that the R.H.S. of the f.o.c. is the same as the value function V
levered
.




































≠flT” into (38) and then ◊


























Here, f (◊) is positive, increasing for ’◊ œ (0,1) and




















Therefore, there exists a unique solution ◊ú = e≠—T ú” œ (0,1) that solves (39).
The value of leveraged investment V
leveraged
is decreasing in s and strictly de-
creasing when V
leveraged
> 1. This is because when the repo spread lowers, the
borrower can continue to choose the same amount of haircut capital and achieve








< 0 if s < —(R≠1)≠fl1≠h
= 0 otherwise
Thus we have (I.12).































































































which is true for ’h œ [0,1) by the assumption that assets are profitable. Therefore,
ŝ > 0.




, (I.16) and (I.14), we have
š(V
I
) = (1≠ q) –fl
– +fl (VI ≠1)
Moreover, the solution to the fixed point problem such that
š = (1≠ q) –fl
– +fl (VI (š)≠1)
always exists and unique because the L.H.S. is strictly increasing in s and the
R.H.S. is nonnegative and weakly decreasing in s by Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. It is straightforward. The unique of equilibrium follows
the uniqueness of solution to the first order condition from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) ds
ú
dq
Æ 0 is straightforward. From the Implicit Function
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Theorem and 61, it is enough to show ˆVB
ˆs











(xú (s2) ,T ú
”
(s2))
Then at the lower repo rate s2, borrower can still choose xú (s1) and T ú
”
(s1) and











































































































































































which is the solution to ◊1 (s12) = ◊2 (s12) where
Y © 4fl(1≠h)















is decreasing in h (Note that Y < 1 from R ≠ 1 Ø 4 fl
—
.) Then
from ◊ú (0) > ◊1 (0) > ◊2 (0) = 0, s
◊
> ŝ is equivalent to s12 < s
◊





























































is increasing in Y . Then from the



































Claim 1. The LHS in (44) is increasing in Z and the inequality holds as Z æ Z̄.
Thus the inequality holds for ’Z.
Proof of Claim1. First show that the LHS is increasing in Z. Consider the














≠Zfl/— Ø 0 (45)












. It is increasing
in fl
—
, so the inequality holds if and only if fl
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= 1 Ø lim
fl/—æ0
Z (r)fl/— = 1
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Thus, the inequality (45) holds for ’Z. Finally show that the inequality in (44)
holds as Z æ Z̄. As Z is increasing in Y and Y is decreasing in h, Z is decreasing









































































































































































< 0, it is enough to show x Ø dx
dq
That is, x(q) Æ eq. We know x(q) Æ 1
and eq Ø 1 for ’q.




, the supply of the sec-










) ú (t) and the demand for
asset is given by –1xú1 (µC (t)+ qµR (t)) . Thus the necessary condition for the
stable path I.35 follows.
Proof of Proposition 4. To show this is an equilibrium path, I only need to show
(i) With lim
tæ0+ h(t)ú = 1, the borrowers cannot take leverage anyway. Therefore,
they (at least weakly) prefer lim
tæ0+ xú
t
= 0 to any other alternatives, hence it is
optimal.
(ii) The demand for the secondary market is as below (the buyers of the secondary













and the supply is ˆ 0
≠T ≠”
e—· –0 (µ
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There is an excess supply and the price reached at the lower bound.
















As there is always a positive measure of cash investors, the equilibrium repo rate
is determined so as to repo investors and cash investors are indi erent.




) > 0 if and only if

















where the last equality follows the equilibrium property h = „ (I.26). Define
k © max
–,—,„,s
(1≠ ◊ú)xú œ [0,1)




) > 0 is that















two cases: (i) ŝ Æ ˆ̂s and ŝ = s
b
. Then the condition is equivalent to s
l
< ŝ Æ ˆ̂s and
(ii) ˆ̂s Æ ŝ and ˆ̂s = s
b
. Then since V
I
is decreasing in s, (I.17) and (I.18) imply that
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ˆ̂s Ø š. Thus, š < s
b
is equivalent to s
l
< ŝ Æ ˆ̂s.
If q = 1, s
l
= 0 and s
b




. Now for q < 1, the su cient





























































































































































































































































Here, the L.H.S. is increasing in h and the R.H.S. is independent of h. Therefore,
there exists ȟ such that the condition is equivalent to
h Æ ȟ if and only if s
l
< ŝ
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the economy can be described with the parame-
ters before the shock {q0,–0,—0,‡0,fl0,R0,„0} and after the shock {q,–,—,‡,fl,R,„}.
By Proposition 1, a unique stationary equilibrium exists in the economy before












. In a repo run defined
in Proposition 4, all the existing borrowers and repo investors before the shock
go bankrupt and exit the economy. It can improve Pareto e ciency to tax ex-
isting repo investors and support existing borrowers so that they can a ord to
pay sú1, which is the repo spread at a stationary equilibrium with the parameters
after the shock. As all cash of the repo investors is lent to borrowers, taxing
repo investors can be implemented by forcing repo investors to forgive some of the
principal and/or to accept lower repo interests than they would require otherwise.
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Ø exp{≠ [(— ≠—0)(t≠T )+—0T ú
”
(t0)]} (46)
By forcing repo investors to not receive any interests until the investments mature
and to not circulate their collateral even when they receive an opportunity, we can
increase T ú
”
(t0) æ Œ for ’t0 < T as sú1 = 0 in (I.31) and (I.35), meaning all the exist-
ing investors will never default. Since the LHS in (46) is always positive, the econ-
omy exhibits the stable path. Therefore, with the intervention, all the existing bor-




















fl+— for each repo
investor.
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(s) = –q (1≠ ◊
ú (s))
— +–q (1≠ ◊ú) , (51)
otherwise. Given the solutions (47) - (51), I find the repo spread in (61).
A.2 Extensions
Extension: Long-lived FIs
In this model, FIs whose investments mature, as well as FIs who go bankrupt,
exit the economy and are replaced by an equal measure of new FIs. Here, I show
the model’s implications are robust to relaxing this assumption so that borrowers
whose investment mature stay in the economy and choose to become either repo
investors or cash investors until their investment opportunity arrives again.
To solve the model with long-lived FIs I need an assumption below to simplify
the wealth distribution across the FIs. Even in a stationary equilibrium, the
borrower’s wealth at the investment maturity depends not only on how long the
investment took but also on their wealth when the investment maturity arrived,
making the problem intractable. So I assume FIs consume the proceeds except for
their initial capital, making all the FIs start with the same wealth level.
Assumption 1. FIs consume everything but their initial capital of 1 when their
investment mature.
I solve numerically both stationary equilibrium and transition path. The results
are qualitatively the same and presented in 11.
The borrower’s optimization problem now depends on the value function of repo
investors/cash investors in the future. The levered and unlevered value function
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Figure 11: Comparing stationary equilibrium of the model (OLG) with long-lived
FIs.






































Note that the higher value function of repo investor/cash investor (which is the
same in equilibrium) increases the value function of unlevered value function. Also
it tends to discourage borrowers from taking high leverage as it increases the losses
they su er upon bankruptcy.
A.3 Transition Path
Transition Path: Optimization Problems
Below I describe the borrower’s optimization problem and the clearing of the
secondary market along the transition path. The rest of model is not substantially
changed from a stationary equilibrium by allowing dynamics. Here, I focus on the
case where only the degree of circulation goes down from q≠ = 1 to q+ < 1, but no
other parameter changes. The procedures are similar for other types of shocks.
Consider a borrower who receives an investment opportunity at ’t > 0. He knows
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all the parameter values after the shock and faces possibly fluctuating haircuts
and repo rates. As he chooses the size of investment once and cannot partially
liquidate the project, he pays out of the bu er capital or is paid extra cash as









. Suppose the haircut increases from h(t) to h(t+ t) > h(t). To












Denote by  (t,T ) the cumulative discounted cash outflows due to changes in
haircuts between t and T > 0. Then we have

























Now, the borrower problem is similar to the one in stationary equilibrium except
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Here, the l.h.s. is the remaining bu er capital at the time the shock arrives. The
r.h.s. is the total cash outflow due to the fluctuating repo rate and the haircut.
The borrower initially chooses the maximum duration of T ≠
”
of a stationary equi-





changes due to the shock. Clearly, when the








, meaning existing borrowers are forced into earlier bankruptcy.
Transition Path: Clearing the Secondary Market
First, let me explain how to solve the evolution of relative measures. For ’t > 0,
the measure of borrowers µ
I
(t) changes is given
dµ
I
























·1{·+T ú” (·)=t}d· (59)
The first two parts are similar to stationary equilibrium except that now q+ after
the shock is lower than one. Fewer repo investors can circulate collateral and be-
come borrowers. The third part is the outflow of the borrowers due to bankruptcy
at t. The increasing haircut may force many borrowers into bankruptcy, result-
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ing in the negative jump. The measure of repo investors and cash investors are
straightforward.
Then we can calculate the total demand for assets and the supply of the secondary
market. There is an excess supply when the supply of the secondary market is
higher than total demand for the assets, in which case the price p should adjust
downward to clear the market. At ’t > 0, there is an excess supply in the secondary






























·1{·+T ú” (·)=t}d· (60)
where the l.h.s. is the total demand, the flow of new borrowers multiplied by
their leverage, and the r.h.s. is the supply of the secondary market, which is the
aggregate quantity of assets liquidated by repo investors whose borrowers went
bankrupt.
A.4 Bargaining Problem between Borrowers and Lenders





so that repos create a surplus. How lenders and bor-
rowers divide the surplus depends on their bargaining power. In a competitive
equilibrium with no search and matching frictions, the surplus division is deter-
mined by the market clearing condition.
A quick thought experiment demonstrates this bargaining problem. Suppose the




) so that all FIs without op-
portunities prefer to lend. Also suppose there is su cient cash in the system to
meet the demand of all investors, and some FIs without opportunities have to be
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left as waiters. Then waiters are willing to receive s
l
+ ‘ for an arbitrary small
‘ > 0 to attract borrowers and become lenders. Thus, if there exists a waiter
with the spread s
l
, the equilibrium repo spread is s
l
in which case all the surplus
is extracted by borrowers and FIs without opportunities are indi erent between
lending and waiting. Now, what if there is not enough cash in the system, so
that some investors cannot borrow at s
l
? Then the investors who cannot borrow
are willing to pay more to attract lenders, which drives up the repo spread. The
repo spread will increase until all investors in the economy can borrow. However,
the repo spread cannot be higher than the maximum spread s
b
. If there are no
waiters in the economy at the spread s
b
, all the surplus is extracted by lenders
and investors are indi erent between borrowing and not borrowing (if s
b
= ŝ) or
borrowing and lending (if s
b






1. sú = s
l
: The surplus is extracted by borrowers. All investors borrow and FIs
without opportunities are indi erent between lending and waiting.
2. sú = s
b
: The surplus is extracted by lenders. Some investors borrow while
other investors become lenders or make unlevered investments, whichever
they prefer. All FIs without opportunities lend.




): The surplus is divided between borrowers and lenders so that
the repo market clears and there are no waiters.
The division of surplus is determined by the equilibrium mass of cash investors, i.e.,
whether there is enough cash in the system to fund investors. It depends on the
leverage that investors take, which in turn depends on the repo spread determined
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by the bargaining problem. Then, we can easily solve the bargaining problem
between borrowers and lenders by examining the mass of waiters at di erent levels
of repo spread µ
C
(·) as determined in (47) - (51).




. That is, the minimum spread for lending s
l
is higher than the maximum spread for borrowing s
b
. In this case, the repo contract
does not create surplus, thus the repo markets shut down in equilibrium. The
shadow price for the repo spread exists and equals s
l
at which no investors borrow.
So, we have one more type of equilibrium, in addition to the three considered
above:
4. sú = s
l
: The repo markets shut down, as repos do not create surplus.










































Also note that there are four types of equilibria. The repo markets open in Type
1 - Type 3 equilibria, where the maximum spread for investors to borrow is at
least as high as the minimum spread for FIs without opportunities to lend; thus
the repos create a surplus. The three types of equilbria di er in the division of the
surplus created from repo contracts. In a Type 1 equilibrium, there is a positive
mass of waiters and all the surplus is extracted by borrowers, leaving FIs without
opportunities indi erent between lending and waiting. On the other hand, in a
Type 2 equilibrium, the surplus is extracted by lenders and only some investors
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Figure 12: The figures plot the equilibrium repo spread and the masses of di erent
types of FIs as the transaction cost parameter „ changes.
borrow from the repo market, leaving other investors to either not borrow or
become lenders. In a Type 3 equilibrium, both borrowers and lenders are more
better o  by entering the repo contracts. Lastly, in a Type 4 equilibrium, there
is no repo market as investors prefer not to borrow at the spread that lenders
require.
I find that for an arbitrary set of parameters that describes the economy {q,–,—,‡,fl,R},
there is an interval for the transaction cost parameter „ in which a competitive
stationary equilibrium is always of Type 1 (i.e., the repo market opens in an equi-
librium and all investors can finance their leveraged investments). The following
proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 6. For an arbitrary set of parameters {q,–,—,fl,R}, there always
exists a lower bound of transaction cost „̌(q,–,—,fl,R) œ [0,1], and an upper bound
of the transaction cost „̂(q,–,—,fl,R) œ [0,1], such that a competitive station-
















Moreover, with perfect circulation (q = 1), we have „̂(q,–,—,fl,R) = 1 for ’–,—,fl
and R. That is, the repo market always opens in equilibrium.
The intuition is as follows. In a stationary equilibrium the transaction cost equals
the equilibrium haircut (I.26), as the demand for assets is always greater than the
supply in the secondary market. Thus the interval for the transaction cost directly
translates into the interval for the equilibrium haircut. As the transaction cost
decreases (h √ 0), an individual borrower can take higher leverage while pledging
the same amount of capital. The high leverage increases the demand for credit,
saturating all the liquidity (cash) in the system. Thus with a very low level of
the transaction cost, the system cannot provide enough cash and the borrowers
have to compete for credit, resulting in either a Type 2 equilibrium (where lenders
extract all the surplus) or a Type 3 equilibrium (where borrowers and lenders share
the surplus). On the other hand, as the transaction cost increases, the amount of
leverage an individual can take is very limited. With very low leverage (h ¬ 1),
borrowing may not be attractive enough to justify setting aside the bu er capital
and paying the repo interest. An investor may prefer financing the investment
with their cash only, resulting in a Type 4 equilibrium where the repo market
completely shuts down.
Therefore, it is with the intermediate value of the transaction cost and thus the
haircut) that a competitive stationary equilibrium is of Type 1. This implies
that the type of market where collateral circulates among a limited number of
FIs is suitable for collateral with intermediate liquidity. Collateral with very high
liquidity may be financed by a larger pool of investors outside the system, while
collateral with very low liquidity can only be financed by equity.
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Figure 13: The data is from 10-K reports of major US broker-dealers: Mor-
gan Stanley, Merrill Lynch/Bank of America, JP Morgan/Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and Citigroup upon availability.
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Chapter II: Heterogeneous Portfolio Constraints and Wealth
Distribution Dynamics
1 Introduction
Empirical studies on household finance document that (i) many households in
the United States do not participate in the stock market, (ii) the portfolio shares
conditional on participation substantially di er across households and (iii) the
portfolio shares exhibit inertia at the household level.1 These facts raise two main
questions. First, why do households behave as they do? Second, what will be the
equilibrium implications of such behaviors for the aggregate economy?
In this paper, I attempt to answer the second question in a simple setup that
reflects properties (i)-(iii). I extend the model of Basak and Cuoco (1998) to many
types of agents including bankers and heterogeneous consumers. While bankers’
portfolios are unconstrained, consumers’ portfolios are constrained so that the
shares of risky investment relative to wealth (portfolio shares2) have exogenous
and heterogeneous upper bounds. In equilibrium, asset prices and the wealth
distribution are jointly determined.
Generally, the wealth distribution should a ect equilibrium asset prices. Gor-
1See Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008) among others.
2This terminology follows Wachter and Yogo (2010)
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man aggregation (the existence of a representative agent whose preferences are
independent of the wealth distribution) only holds under special circumstances.
For example, agents with CRRA preferences should have homogeneous relative
risk aversion for Gorman aggregation to hold. Any departure from this condition
implies significant dependence of asset prices on the wealth distribution.
Moreover, models with portfolio constraints exhibit equilibrium bubbles in both
the stock and the bond prices. Hugonnier (2011) shows that there are equilibrium
bubbles in both the stock and the bond in a model with two types of agents. Such
properties carry over in my model with many types of agents. In particular, I show
the existence of the stock bubble is equivalent to the existence of a consumer whose
wealth relative to the bankers is expected to decline over time, which implies a
diverging wealth distribution. Therefore in this model, not only does the wealth
distribution a ect asset prices, but also asset prices a ect the wealth distribution
as well.
My model exhibits an equilibrium Sharpe ratio (the equity premium per unit risk)
that skyrockets when there is a negative aggregate shock to the economy. In fact,
this countercyclicality of the Sharpe ratio is a quite general feature, driven by
interaction of heterogeneity and the wealth e ect.3 Since agents who bear more
risk (bankers in the model) will be hit harder by a negative shock, the market
e ectively becomes more risk averse and the Sharpe ratio goes up accordingly.
While the Sharpe ratio depends on the entire distribution of wealth, I find one
state variable that summarizes the wealth distribution regardless of the number
of types of agents.
3Models with heterogeneous relative risk aversion as well as models with (heterogeneous)
portfolio constraints exhibit countercyclical Sharpe ratios.
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Furthermore, I ask when the Sharpe ratio would be more or less sensitive to
aggregate shocks. I find that the Sharpe ratio is more sensitive in a bad economy
compared to a good economy, (i.e., the countercyclicality of the Sharpe ratio is also
countercyclical). Therefore the e ect of serial bad shocks is greater than the sum
of the e ects of each shock. The frequency of shocks as well as their magnitudes
matter for both the asset prices and wealth distribution.
In this model, the high Sharpe ratio in a bad economy is driven by the low real
interest rate. When the Sharpe ratio is extremely high, the real interest rate
goes negative, which implies high inflation. The government can help stabilize the
economy by either transferring the wealth of consumers to bankers or relaxing the
portfolio constraints of the consumers. It is more e ective to act quickly rather
than wait because the economy can become more vulnerable.
Transfering the wealth of consumers to bankers increases aggregate risk taking be-
cause bankers can take more risk than consumers whose portfolios are constrained.
The Sharpe ratio decreases and the real interest rate increases immediately. It
will be more e ective to transfer the wealth of the most constrained consumers to
bankers. This policy amplifies the trends of diverging wealth distribution.
Alternatively, the government can directly tackle consumers’ portfolio constraints.
Relaxing the constraints stabilizes not only the asset prices but also the wealth
distribution. In the short run, the government can borrow from consumers and
invest in the stock. When the economy stabilizes, the government can return the
proceeds to the consumers. That way, consumers e ectively invest more in the
stock than their portfolio constraints allow them to do, when the Sharpe ratio
is very high. In the long run, the government can mitigate the sources of the
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portfolio constraints.
This paper is silent about why consumers behave as they do and why their portfo-
lios may be constrained. Basak and Cuoco (1998) point out some fixed information
costs as one reason for stock market nonparticipation. ? show that nonpartici-
pation may be a rational decision by ambiguity averse investors. The lack of
insurance markets for idiosyncratic shocks may also force consumers to invest in
the riskless bond. If the portfolio constraints are driven by such frictions, the
government can relax the portfolio constraints by reducing them. For example, by
making the financial system easier to access and/or providing social safety nets
against idiosyncratic shocks. Instead, the portfolio constraints may simply reflect
the preferences of consumers, in which case there is no role for the government.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First of all, my model is
based on the models of stock market nonparticipation. Basak and Cuoco (1998),
motivated by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) who find that only one-fourth US house-
holds own the stock, develop a general equilibrium model with stockholders and
nonstockholders. They show that aggregate relative risk aversion of only 1.3 is
enough to match the historical equity premium.4 Chabakauri (2009) and Prieto
(2010) extend their model to accommodate various types of portfolio constraints.
Hugonnier (2011) show that there is an asset pricing bubble in their model, and
therefore the relative wealth of nonstockholders decreases over time. My model is
a direct extension of his model to many types of agents and to my best knowledge
4Their model has been subject to criticism because of the scanty wealth of nonstockholders.
Nonstockholders own only around 10% of aggregate wealth of the US. (See Guvenen (2009))
This problem can be resolved in my model with heterogeneous portfolio constraints.
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the first in this literature to have more than two types of agents.
Recent studies on household finance document more than stock market nonpar-
ticipation. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) show that portfolio shares are heterogeneous
conditional on stock market participation and the cross-sectional standard devia-
tion of portfolio shares conditional on participation is around 30%. Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008) show that portfolio shares exhibit inertia for a given household.
Their result is consistent with the exogenous portfolio share that is the equilibrium
behavior of my model. Wachter and Yogo (2010) develop a model to explain why
the portfolio shares are postively correlated with the wealth of households.
The dynamic relationship between borrowing constraints and the wealth distri-
bution has been previously studied. Piketty (1997) studies the e ect of credit
rationing on the wealth distribution and finds that higher interest rates can be
self-reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation.
Pawasutipaisit and Townsend (2011), using detailed data from an emerging mar-
ket economy, study factors in achieving upward mobility in the wealth distribu-
tion. They find that the return on assets that depends on several demographic
characteristics, such as the level of education. Their result indicates the signifi-
cance of the portfolio constraints that households face. Piketty and Saez (2003),
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) and Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) study income
and wealth inequality in the US. My model shows how heterogeneous portfolio
constraints can contribute to the trends in wealth inequality.
Wang (1996) and Chan and Kogan (2002) study models with heterogeneous rela-
tive risk aversion. Wang (1996) models agents with CRRA preferences and show
that less risk averse agents dominate the entire economy in the long run. Chan
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and Kogan (2002) model agents with “catching up with the Jones” preferences
that equalize marginal utilities of agents with heterogeneous relative risk aversion.
The wealth distribution in their model remains stationary. It turns out my model
with heterogeneous portfolio constraints has the wealth distribution dynamics in-
between the two.
Related to the recent financial crisis, He and Krishnamurthy (2008) extend the
model of Basak and Cuoco (1998) to the case where the intermediary can directly
invest in the stock and households can either invest in the bond or invest in the
intermediary. They consider various government polices and find infusing equity
capital into intermediaries is the most e ective.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model and defines
an equilibrium. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium wealth dynamics. Section
4 discusses the model’s implications for financial crises and government policies.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The setup follows Basak and Cuoco (1998). I study a pure exchange economy
with one risky stock S and one locally riskless bond B. I assume the horizon
is finite ([0,T ]). I omit the time subscript when it is clear from context. The
model consists of N + 1 (types of) agents including one group of bankers and N
groups of consumers. Constrained agents have heterogeneous portfolio constraints
that set the maximum portfolio shares (the proportion of wealth allocated to risky
investment).5
5In Appendix, I show the model with a continuum of types and consider portfolio constraints
that set the minimum portfolio shares.
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2.1 Setup
Assets There is an exogenously given dividend process ”, which follows a di usion




. It is the only source of uncertainty in the












There are two assets; a risky stock S and a locally riskless bond B. The stock S
can be interpreted as an index fund of all the stocks in the economy. It pays out
the continuous dividend stream ”. The supply of stock is normalized to one share.
An equilibrium stock price can be expressed as a geometric Brownian motion
with drift µ and volatility ‡. The parameters of stock price are determined in















The bond B is in zero net supply. The instantaneous interest rate r
t
is determined
in equilibrium. Note that r is the real interest rate denominated by the consump-
tion good and can be negative due to inflation. The value of a money market fund









The Sharpe ratio, denoted Ÿ
t
, is defined as
Ÿ
t




Let M denote the stochastic discount factor. The initial value M0 is normalized












such that both MB and MS are nonnegative local martingales.6
Agents There are one group of bankers and N groups of consumers. Bankers and
consumers have logarithmic preferences and time discount parameter fl. The only
source of heterogeneity among the agents is given by the maximum portfolio share.
While bankers are unconstrained, consumers have exogeneous and heterogeneous
upper bounds on portfolio shares that range from 0 to 1.
Bankers Since bankers are identical, we can think of a representative banker with
the aggregate wealth of all bankers and call him “the banker”. The banker solves




) to maximize his
lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint, where fi
B
denotes the amount of
the consumption good invested in the stock. Suppose the banker’s initial wealth
is given by his stock holding b0 œ (0,1), i.e., W
B0 = b0 ·S0.
Consumers There are N groups of consumers. For group n œ {1, · · · ,N}, there
is a representative consumer for the group, called “consumer n”. Consumer n’s








6Throughout the paper, local martingales include martingales. Local martingales which are
not martingales are referred as strict local martingales.
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monotonically increasing. Thus, consumer 1 is the least constrained and consumer
N is the most constrained.





) to maximize her lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint and

























































denote the amount invested in the
stock and the bond respectively. Note that the portfolio constraints allow for short-
sales. Suppose her initial wealth, W
n0 is given by the stock holding bn œ (0,1), i.e.
W
n0 = bn ·S0.
Since the bond is in zero net supply, aggregate wealth is always the same as the
stock price S, which implies,
b0 + N
n=1bn = 1. (II.9)
Note that the initial portfolio share is equal to 1 for every agent so that port-
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folio constraints are violated for consumers at t = 0. When the economy starts,
consumers immediately adjust their portfolios to satisfy portfolio constraints.
2.2 Characterization of Equilibrium



















tœ[0,T ] such that
1. Given a price process (B,S), the banker and consumers solve their uncon-









) for all n = 1, · · · ,N .
2. The consumption good market, stock market and bond market all clear.
Individual optimality The solution to the unconstrained optimization problem for
logarithmic preference is widely known. The banker always consumes a fraction
of his wealth and the fraction depends solely on his time preference. His portfolio
share is determined by the Sharpe ratio and the volatility of the stock. For a
constant “
B

























Consumers 1 to N face an incomplete market because of the portfolio constraints.
In general, it is not straightforward to solve for optimal strategies in an incom-
plete market. However, with convex portfolio constraints, as is the case in this
paper, CvitaniÊ and Karatzas (1992) show that there exists a unique solution that
corresponds to the solution of an unconstrained optimization problem in a slightly
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adjusted market.
The problem of solving for the strategies is transformed to that of finding the
“market”. Log investors’ myopicity allows us to solve the transformed problem in
a pointwise manner. Assuming that the adjusted market for each agent is known,
I solve the constrained optimization problems. I denote the e ective Sharpe ratio
of the adjusted market for consumer n by Ÿ
n
. The e ective stochastic discount
factor for consumer n, denoted M
n
, is then determined by Ÿ
n

































Each consumer n œ {1, · · · ,N} now solves her optimization problem as if she is
unconstrained and faces the e ective Sharpe ratio Ÿ
n






















Market clearing conditions I substitute individual optimal solutions (II.10) and
(II.12) into the market clearing conditions for the consumption good, the stock

















where W = W0 + N
n=1Wn.



























Since the bond is in zero net supply and from (II.13), we have
S = W̄ = ÷” (II.16)























which indicates that the wealth-weighted average of the e ective Sharpe ratios is




The equilibrium Sharpe ratio Consider the optimal portfolio strategy fiú
n
for con-
sumer n. Since her optimal portfolio satisfies the portfolio constraints, from (II.8)








> 0 for ’n, e ective Sharpe ratios
are smaller than ‡
”
for every consumer. Since the wealth weighted average of
the Sharpe ratios is always ‡
”
and the e ective Sharpe ratio for every consumer
is smaller than ‡
”
, the market Sharpe ratio should be strictly greater than ‡
”
.







































Note that the wealth ratios between the banker and consumers are crucial in
equilibrium. The e ects of portfolio constraints are amplified when the banker
is relatively poor compared to consumers. In the next section, I solve for the
wealth dynamics of the banker and consumers in the economy and fully describe
an equilibrium.
3 Dynamics of Wealth Distribution
Denote by ⁄
n
the relative wealth of consumer n compared to the banker. The
relative wealth is well-defined as long as the banker has positive wealth, which is
the case because of the Inada conditions. From the optimal consumption strategies
















where a positive constant “
n




. From (II.5) and (II.11),
























































for s Ø t.















































The dynamics of wealth ratio ⁄
n
of consumer n to the banker depends on not only
⁄
n
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n=1. The relative wealth processes evolve according to (II.27)
with the initial value (II.28).
Whether the relative wealth process is a martingale is crucial for the dynamics of
wealth distributions. It is also the key in the existence of the stock bubble. In the
Appendix, I show that the existence of a stock price bubble is equivalent to the
existence of a consumer whose relative wealth compared to the banker decreases
over time in expectation. I also show that the relative wealth processes are not
martingales, but strict local martingales. Therefore the stock price has a bubble
and the consumers are expected to become poorer compared to the banker over
time.
Lemma 1 There exists a stock price bubble if and only if there exists a relative
wealth process that is not a martingale but a strict local martingale.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 The relative wealth process ⁄
n
for ’n are not martingales but strict
local martingales.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the direct e ects of portfolio constraints on the wealth distribution.
Lorenz curves plot how much of aggregate wealth is held by a given proportion of
population. A linear Lorenz curve implies perfectly equal wealth distribution. I
assume the banker and consumer have a perfectly equal wealth distribution and
plot the trends in Lorenz curves for each distribution of portfolio constraints.
For every case, Lorenz curves become more convex and the wealth inequality
88
Figure II.1: Lorenz curves with the distribution of portfolio constraints
The top left panel is when almost no consumer participates in the stock market.
The bottom right panel is when more than 50 percent of consumers have almost
no portfolio constraints.
increases over time. However, the extent to which the wealth distribution diverges
substantially depends on the portfolio constraints. As the portfolio constraints for
consumers are tighter, wealth inequality increases much more quickly.
While equilibrium prices depend on all values of ⁄
n
’s, it is su cient to know the




















k=0 is monotoncially decreasing because ‘n œ (0,1].
Since ‘k
i
approaches zero for any given ‘
i
< 1, I obtain lim
kæŒ  k = ⁄N . The law
of motion for  
k





This analysis extends simply to the case of a continuum of types of consumers.










The initial value and law of motion for  1 are given by (II.30). Equilibrium
wealth dynamics for every agent n œ {1, · · · ,N} are determined by (II.27) with
given initial conditions (II.28).
E ective risk aversion As in Prieto (2010), consumers’ constrained optimal port-
folios can be interpreted as a result of their heterogeneous relative risk aversion.
Note that the optimal portfolio of consumer n is the same as that of a CRRA
investor with relative risk aversion ◊
nt









The relative risk aversion, however, changes over time as the Sharpe ratio changes
over time. Consumers behave as if they are more risk averse when the economy
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is bad. This allows me to compare my model with models with heterogeneous
relative risk aversion. Wang (1996) model agents with CRRA preferences and
show that less risk averse agents deterministically dominate the entire economy in
the long run. Chan and Kogan (2002) model agents with “catching up with the
Jones” preferences that equalize marginal utilities of agents with heterogeneous
relative risk aversion. The wealth distribution in their model remains stationary.
However, in my model, the bankers who are unconstrained and e ectively the least
risk averse are expected to become wealthier compared to the consumers, but only
in expectation. The trends in wealth distribution in my model can be said to be
exactly in between of those two models.
By summing up the e ective risk tolerance (inverse of absolute risk aversion), I













The market risk aversion ◊ is always greater than 1 and countercyclical.
4 Crises and Government Bailouts
This model has the interesting feature that the equilibrium Sharpe ratio and equity
premium skyrocket when the economy is very bad. In fact, it is a quite general
feature driven by the interaction of heterogeneity and the wealth e ect. When
there is a negative shock, agents with higher risk capacity su er more and become
relatively poorer. The aggregate risk capacity of the market shrinks, thus the
Sharpe ratio skyrockets. In concurrent research, He and Krishnamurthy (2008)
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study such dynamics during crises in a model where only financial intermediaries
can invest in the stock market. This model also finds the countercyclicality of
Sharpe ratio, i.e., high Sharpe ratios in recessions and low Sharpe ratios in booms.
As shown in the previous section, the equilibrium Sharpe ratio depends on the state
variable  1 that summarizes the wealth distribution regardless of the number of
agents. The state variable  1 is the constraint-weighted sum of wealth ratios of
consumers and the banker. To see the cyclical properties of the Sharpe ratio,
consider






dt < 0 (II.35)
which indicates the countercyclicality of the Sharpe ratio. Due to logarithmic
preferences of consumers and the banker, the stock price has a constant drift
and volatility. Instead, the countercyclicality of the Sharpe ratio is driven by the
interest e ect. In the bad economy, i.e., the aggregate dividend realization is very
low, the real interest rate drops steeply, indicating high inflation.
Then when would the economy be more or less sensitive to bad shocks? To an-
swer this question, I explore the cyclical property of such countercyclicality. The

















dt < 0, (II.36)
which indicates the countercyclicality of the countercyclicality. In other words,
the economy is more vulnerable to bad shocks when the economy is already bad.
Therefore the e ect of serial bad shocks is bigger than the sum of e ects of indi-
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vidual shocks. Not only the size of shocks but also the frequency of the shocks
matter. To my best knowledge, this paper is first to theoretically show this e ect.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium Sharpe ratio Ÿ is countercyclical and the extent to
which Ÿ is countercyclical is also countercyclical.
Now I consider potential government policies to stabilize the economy with a
high Sharpe ratio and inflation. To reduce the Sharpe ratio and increase the real








we can see the government needs to increase the banker’s wealth (W
B
ø), decrease
the wealth of consumers (W
n
¿), or relax the portfolio constraints for the consumers
(‘
n
¿). Moreover, it is more e ective to act quickly rather than wait because
the economy becomes more vulnerable to bad shocks (due to the countercyclical
countercyclicality of the Sharpe ratio).
Transfering the wealth of consumers to bankers can decrease the consumers’ wealth
and increase the banker’s wealth. This is to bail out bankers by taxing consumers.
The transfer increases aggregate risk capacity and decreases the Sharpe ratio ac-
cordingly. Moreover, for a given size transfer, it is most e ective to transfer the
wealth of the most constrained consumers to bankers. Such a transfer of wealth
from consumers to the banker amplifies the trends of diverging wealth distribution.
Alternatively, the government can directly tackle consumers’ portfolio constraints.
Relaxing the constraints stabilizes not only the asset prices but also the wealth
distribution. In the short run, the government can borrow from consumers and
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invest in the stock. Borrowing from consumers can be done by taxing them or is-
suing government debts. Consumers may view the government debts as equivalent
to the banker’s debt.7 When the economy stabilizes, the government can return
the proceeds to the consumers directly or indirectly by reducing taxes. That way,
consumers e ectively invest more in the stock than their portfolio constraints allow
them to do, especially when the Sharpe ratio is very high.
In the long run, the government can mitigate the sources of the portfolio con-
straints. This requires a rigorous investigation on why consumers behave as they
do, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Previous studies on stock market
nonparticipation sugggest some fixed information costs (Basak and Cuoco (1998))
and ambiguity aversion (?). Or, the lack of insurance markets for idiosyncratic
shocks may also force consumers to invest in the riskless bond (the precaution-
ary saving motive). If the portfolio constraints are driven by such frictions, the
government can relax the portfolio constraints by, for example, making the finan-
cial system more transparent and easier (reducing information costs), regulating
unlikely events (reducing ambiguity), and/or providing social safety nets against
idiosyncratic shocks (reducing precautionary saving motives). However, the port-
folio constraints may simply reflect the preferences of consumers as heterogeneous
e ective relative risk aversion, in which case there is no role for the government.
7The probability of banker’s default is zero in a physical probability measure, because the




I study a general equilibrium model of stock market nonparticipation and heteroge-
neous portfilo constraints. In equilibrium, the asset prices and wealth distribution
are jointly determined. I find that the Sharpe ratio is countercyclical and the
countercyclicality is also countercyclical. I also show the relative wealth of con-
sumers to bankers is expected to decrease over time. I discuss the implications of
the model for financial crises and government bailouts.
It is left for future study to explain why consumers behave as they do. Whether
consumers’ portfolio constraints are driven by various frictions or simply reflect
their preferences is crucial in the policy perspective. Moreover, this model is a
pure exchange economy. It will be interesting to study the interaction between
portfolio constraints and production in a macroeconomic model.
A Appendix
Proof for Lemma 1 Define the fundamental value F of the stock S as the dis-






























































ds > 0 (40)
Therefore, there exists a stock price bubble if and only if there exists a relative
wealth process that is a strict local martingale.
Proof for Lemma 2 I want to prove that ⁄
n
is not a martingale by the Feller’s
explosion test that is used in Heston, Loewenstein, and Willard (2007) for all
n œ {1, · · · ,N}, . The spirit of the proof is first to claim that the process is a
martingale and the risk neutral measure is equivalent. Then I show that the risk
neutral measure is not equivalent to (or absolutely continuous with respect to) the
physical measure, therefore ⁄
n
is not a martingale.
Proof. Consider the candidate risk neutral measure and denote its Brownian mo-
























Denote the drift and volatility of ⁄
n


































































































































unbounded as y æ 0. However, v
c










is bounded as x æ Œ. This implies that ⁄
n
reaches infinity at a finite time with
a positive probability under the risk neutral measure, while it doesn’t under the
physical measure because preferences satisfy Inada conditions and the dividend
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never hits zero. Therefore the two measures are not equivalent, thus ⁄
n
is not a
martingale for every n œ {1, · · · ,N}.
A continuum of agents The model can be easily extended to the case with a con-
tinuum of constrained agents. I assume a mass of constrained agents normalized
to one. Constrained agents are indexed by i for i œ [0,1]. Consider an arbitrary





. Recycle the notations { 
k
}Œ









I can solve for {d 
k
}Œ
k=0 by multiplying ‘(i)
k and integrating over i. For ’k Ø 0,
I obtain the exactly same dynamics (II.30) and the Sharpe ratio is also the same
as (II.31).
Minium portfolio share constraints Now I consider portfolio constraints which
force agents to take more risks than they would otherwise. For simplicity, consider
three types of agents: unconstrained Agent 0, constrained with maximum portfolio





> 0, the portfolio share of Agent m is bounded above by 1≠ ‘
n
and that of
Agent n is bounded below by 1+ ‘
m
. Denote the e ective Sharpe ratios for Agent




































In Case 1, the portfolio constraint of Agent m binds and that of Agent n doesn’t.
















































































W0 < ‘mWm Æ ‘nWn + ‘nW0 (57)


































In Case 3, the portfolio constraint of Agent m does not bind and that of Agent n
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